Melvin Ingram is a good example of it taking past the age 23 season for the picture to become clear.  He came into the league at the “old” age of 23 and has only played double digit games in a season twice in his four years in the NFL.  Being injured so frequently made it tough for him to develop his natural tools and it wasn’t until 2016 that Ingram finally got his feet under him.

Ingram lined up in one position on nearly every pass rush attempt he took.  However, he was fairly evenly split between lining up on the left and right side of the offensive line.  There’s not much to glean from where Ingram lines up.  The Chargers used him in a pretty vanilla fashion as a 3-4 outside linebacker.  However, it should be noted that San Diego defensive coordinator John Pagano had Ingram drop into coverage far too often, at least over the first half of the season, for my liking and it shows up in his splits for the season’s first and second halves.  Always let your best pass rusher focus on rushing the passer.

By all measures, Ingram had an incredible 2015 season.  He had been swiftly labeled a bust after his first three seasons in the NFL, over which he combined for 6 sacks in 29 games.  Finally, four seasons into his career, Ingram seems to have figured it all out.  His ability to beat his blocker, pressure the quarterback, and bring him to the ground were all exceptional in 2015.

His Pressure Rate of 20.9% is truly elite.  Of the limited sample of players I have charted from 2015 Ingram’s 20.9% is the best of the bunch.  It’s also the only one above 20%.  Being able to directly negatively impact the offense one out of every five times you rush the quarterback isn’t anything to laugh at.  Conversely, his Win Rate of 23.5% is average to just below average.  It’s to be expected, though, that as you create pressure on a higher percentage of plays where you beat your blockers you’re going to simply “win” on a lower percentage.  That’s a trade off that I would happily take.

Even more notable than Ingram’s improvement from his first three seasons into his fourth is his improvement from the first half of 2015 into the second half.  A lot of that had to do with John Pagano finally allowing him to rush the passer rather than dropping him into coverage, but the Melvin Ingram we saw in Week 1 is not the same Melvin Ingram we saw in Week 17.  It was throughout the course of the season that he found his place in the Charger’s defense.  Before Week 8, Ingram had a Pressure/Win/Loss slash line of 15.2%/24.2%/60.6%.  Those numbers are all well below average and place him right in line with Bruce Irvin, who was similarly misused in Seattle.  However, for Week 8 and on his slash line improved to 23.2%/23.2%/53.7%.  If those were his numbers over the full season, I think you could make the argument that he was a top 15 EDGE rusher in 2015.

The ways Ingram won are just as impressive as how often he won.  He showed an exceptionally well rounded repertoire of pass rush moves, especially for how dominant his natural tools can be.  Ingram could have substantial success if he only relied on those natural tools.  However, mixing in counter moves such as an inside rip, swim, and spin to compliment the bend, bull rush, and initial jump he already has is what made his 2015 great.  It’s also what makes me think the success that he saw over the last 8 games of 2015 will be translated into 2016.

Not only is his advanced repertoire of pass rush moves encouraging, but he also rarely had his success due to coverage or being left unblocked.  They account for only 12.8% of his successes.  The only player with a lower figure is Olivier Vernon at 7.8%.  The lower the percentage of successes that isn’t actually due to the player’s merit, the more translatable that success is into future seasons.

Ingram having his first successful season at 26 years old defies what we know about EDGE rushers having success later in their careers, but it makes sense why he was able to bend the rules.  The constant injuries that Ingram faced made it difficult for him to develop the natural talent that he has always had.  Ingram broke one rule, but he provided a prime example for another.  It would have been easy to discount that Ingram would ever have success after his first three seasons in the league.  EDGE rusher evaluation is an exercise in patience rather than one about making snap decisions.  Melvin Ingram, at least as of right now, is proof of that.

Lynch’s alignments are very concentrated, more so than any other player I’ve charted, save for Olivier Vernon.  He spent just over 90% of his time at either 7 or 9 technique and just over 3/4 of his time on the left side of the defensive line.  Just about 70% of his pass rushes came from the 7/9 technique on the left side of the line.  Allowing a player as “raw” as Lynch specialize in one area like that until he gets his feet under him in the NFL is smart coaching from the 49ers staff.  Lynch has obvious strengths that he can rely on to win consistently, so it’s a smart move to allow him to sit on those strengths without throwing too much at him.  That was he can develop at a quicker pace both mentally and technically.  Even with most veteran players it’s typical to see limited diversity in alignments, so this doesn’t have to change as Lynch matures either.

As a pass rusher, all of Lynch’s success rates are right around average.  Hi pressure rate of 17.4% is just above average, while his win rate of 23.9% is just below the average number.  Add them together and his cumulative success rate of 41.3% is also right above the average.  His One vs One success rates are also right around average.  These numbers don’t fully do Lynch justice, but more on that later.

Once he creates pressure, Lynch brings the quarterback to the ground about 1/5 of the time.  21.1% to be exact.  That number is definitely the worst of all of his success rates and really the only one that is solidly below average.  That’s expected, though, as most players don’t hit their stride with sacks until their third season in the league.  Lynch has had 6 and 6.5 sacks in his first two seasons, respectively, so I would expect him to make the jump to double digits next year.  He has produced more than most young players as well, so I don’t think it’s out of the question for him to really put it all together next season and be one of the top sack producers in the league, either.

Here is where it all comes together for Lynch.  What he’s doing as a pass rusher is pretty standard for a young player.  Nothing special, just enough to be considered a fine starter with the ability to and improve and become a pretty good one.  It’s how he is doing it that makes me think he could be really, really good one.

This is where the part about how Lynch is a master craftsman with only a hammer comes in.

Lynch wins primarily with his natural skill-set; power, quick acceleration, and speed around the corner.  Those abilities are mostly constituted in three areas: bending-the-edge, bull rush, and initial jump.  Lynch’s long legs give him the ability to cover tons of ground when running-the-arc compared to the kick slide of offensive tackles.  That combined with his flexibility makes his speed rush difficult to stop.  He also has impressive strength, which, when combined with his length, makes him a huge bull rush threat.  His ability to beat offensive tackles with an initial jump off the snap is powered by the quick acceleration and burst in his lower body.

When you combine those three areas they make up 64.5% of his total successes.  That number is high on it’s own but it’s even more significant when you compare it to other EDGE rushers.  If you factor out pass rushes where Lynch had success due to coverage or being left unblocked, since they don’t really represent any particular skill, the percentage of his wins that come from the three areas jumps all the way to 82.9%.  That number is hugely significant, especially compared to other EDGE rushers.

Every five times Lynch beats his man, more than four of those times statistically are going to be from one of the three areas mentioned.  It’s incredible that he was able to have the success he had in 2015 when opposing offensive tackles pretty much knew they were going to be hit with one of two things every play.

As Lynch develops into a complete pass pass rusher, or really even if he doesn’t, he will continue to become an even better pass rusher.  If and when he gets to the point that an offensive tackle has to be aware of a couple moves in addition to the natural abilities he already brings to the table, then Lynch will become one of the best in the game.  He already seems to have a little to build on in that area.  He showed that he could have success semi-consistently with a swim move and he displayed rip and spin moves when needed.  Developing one or two of those moves into consistent threats when needed will push him over the top.

Aaron Lynch is already a master craftsman with only a hammer.  Once he has a full tool-belt to work with, there isn’t going to be much offensive tackles can do but watch as he takes up position as one of the best EDGE rushers in the league.

Bill Belichick is undoubtedly the best head coach in the NFL, maybe the best of all time, and I have no doubt that playing Jones the way he did was the best thing for the team, but it wasn’t the best thing for Jones.  Jones’ versatility is one of his greatest assets and also one of his biggest weaknesses.  Had he been used almost exclusively on the edge Jones might be more than a mediocre pass rusher and good run defender.  However, at this point, that seems like all he is.

Chandler Jones has an alignment chart unlike pretty much every other EDGE rusher in the league.  Just like most, he spent the huge majority of his time on the right side of the defensive line.  Even when he lined up at 3-technique, he was on the right side of the line far more often than not.  He spent 77.3% if his snaps on the right side, 16.5% on the interior, and only 6% on the left.  Only taking 16.5% of his snaps on the interior may not seem like much, but he played an even higher percentage of his snaps out of his best position.  Ideally you want a player like Jones to spend pretty much all of his time at 7-technique, while he also can be pretty effective at 5-tech or even as a Wide 9.  The Patriots, though, had Jones align inside on over 20% of his snaps.

Jones is one of the very few EDGE rushers in the league who creates pressure more than he “wins”.  It’s an odd result, but also a very good one because it means he is making the most of his successes.  His high Sack Rate of 47.4% also corroborates that.  Rather than just beating his man without really having an effect on the play, Jones negatively impacts the play for the offense on the majority of the plays where he defeats his blocker.  The biggest reason I can think for why Jones is so much better at this than the majority of NFL EDGE rushers is because of his huge stride.  It’s simple math.  The more ground you can cover with each stride and fewer strides it takes you to reach the quarterback, the less time he has to get the ball out of his hand or avoid the rush.  Stride length is a big thing for EDGE rushers, and really any position, that often gets overlooked.  Fellow PM writer Garrett went into the topic further.

Jones may be better than average at making an impact when he has success, but his success rates are not as rosy as they appear.  If you add together his Pressure and Win Rates they are below average and contra to that his Loss Rate of 70.4% is above average.  Even if you isolate his pass rush attempts on the edge, his numbers are still only right around the average.  Keep in mind that pretty much all of the players charted are high level pass rushers so Jones is still a well above average EDGE rushers in the context of the NFL.  However, you would much rather have a consistent impact pass rusher rather than the high impact, high variance numbers than come from Jones.

Playing his snaps in such a wide variety of positions no doubt impacted his ability to find a rhythm from any one spot along the defensive line. However, these numbers paint a picture of a high variance pass rusher, who obviously has plus run defense ability, rather than a top tier rusher.

The frequency of how Jones creates creates his pressures and wins may make him seem like a player with a limited repertoire of pass rush moves, but I don’t think he is anything of the sort.  Sure, 61.8% of his pressures coming from a speed rush or bull rush means he relied very heavily on those attacks to have success, but he by no means needed to.  His speed and bull rushes are just that good that he can turn to them so frequently and still have success with them.  Jones’ long strides make it very hard for any offensive tackle’s kick slide to keep up with him around the corner and his long arms, low playing level, and ability to generate explosive power from his legs come together form his strong bull rush.

Jones also has strong and technically sound hands, which is what gives him rip and swim moves that he can win with if need be.  He has his fair share of successes that come from coverage and being left unblocked, like any player, but the 14.7% of his pressures and wins that come from those two areas combined is still well below the average.

It is yet to be known how Jones’ new coaching staff will choose to use him.  The Cardinals run their base defense out of a 3-4 alignment and Ourlads currently has him listed as a 3-4 DE.  If true, that could hamper the impact Jones has.  Playing as a 3-4 outside linebacker could be the perfect situation for him to succeed.  It will maximize his ability as a pass rusher and magnify the impact he has as a run defender.

It is rare for a player to make a big jump at the age of 26 like Jones has the opportunity to do this season.  If he needed development as a player that would be a different story, but Jones simply needs to have extended exposure to playing a true EDGE position.  That could turn him from a terrific run defender and spotty pass rusher into a player who can dominate in both areas.  If the Cardinals’ coaching staff uses him correctly as a full time outside linebacker in their 3-4 defense, Jones could join the ranks of the elite in 2016.

Good pass rushers are going to put up big sack numbers, but not all pass rushers who put up big sack numbers are good.  Mercilus’ 2015 season fits much better in the second category than the first.  His spike in production may be due to an all-around improvement, an improved ability to bring the quarterback to the ground, or simply variation, but one thing is for sure: his performance didn’t match his production.

Like most of the EDGE rushers I’ve charted so far, Mercilus spends the majority of his time as a 7-technique.  Unlike most, though, he spent a good amount of time on the interior.  He was hardly ever used as an actual down lineman on the interior, rather he essentially played as an inside linebacker shifted down into the A or B gaps.

Another note about Mercilus’ alignment is that he split his time somewhat evenly between the right, left, and interior of the defensive line.  He spent 56.7% of his snaps on the left side of the defensive line, 29.6% of his snaps on the right, and 13.5% on the interior.  That’s not a perfectly even split, but it’s much closer than the few other players who I’ve charted.

Mercilus’ success numbers are really good on the surface.  He creates pressure on nearly 20% of his pass rush attempts, he “wins” at just about the same rate, and he loses only 59.3% he rushes the passer.  Those numbers aren’t great, but they are good and much better than you would expect from a player who was as mediocre as Mercilus was in his first 3 years in the league.  Those numbers even look slightly better when only focusing on his success rates when on the edge.  There he has a 19.6% pressure rate, a 22.5% win rate, and a 57.8% loss rate.  This indicates that he probably shouldn’t have been used on the interior as much as he was, but you can’t really blame the Texans for wanting to use their two more talented pass rushers on the edge.

His sack rate of 45.5% is probably the most impressive part of this chart.  It’s roughly 10 percentage points higher than Bruce Irvin’s sack rate and roughly 20 percentage points higher than Olivier Vernon’s, both of whom were highly coveted free agents.

Everything on the surface here seems encouraging, but digging down deeper it shows how Mercilus put up these numbers, which isn’t as encouraging.  The problem with the underlying cause of Mercilus’ production is that the majority of it came in two games where the tackles he was facing were hurt.  54.5% of his pressures and 90% of his sacks came from Week 8 against Tennessee, where he faced Taylor Lewan with a shoulder injury for most of his attempts, and Week 17 against Jacksonville, where he faced Luke Joeckel with a back injury for most of his attempts.  Those two games only account for 33% of his total attempts on the season, so you can see the disparity there.  Lewan and Joeckel are average starters at best when healthy, so facing them while hurt is not much of a challenge for a pass rusher.

If you look at Mercilus’ 6 other games on the season, his pressure rate falls to only 12.7%, his win rate jumps slightly to 25.3%, his loss rate jumps to 62%, and his sack conversion rate plummets to only 10%.  Those numbers reflect the caliber of pass rusher that Mercilus is much better.

The breakdown of how Mercilus beat offensive linemen reveals two things about him. 1) He is more an all-around solid player than someone that wins with a particular strength or “trump card.”  2) In addition to a lot of his production coming in two games, a lot of his production came due to coverage or being left unblocked.

Mercilus being a solid all-around player is more of a good thing than bad.  He does a very good job of setting up his next pass rush(es) on previous plays.  His well-roundedness is also more due to him having multiple “good” moves than many “bad” moves.  The only issue is that he is not able to consistently win with many moves at once.  He shows flashes of a great bull rush, the ability to bend at a high level, and the ability to time snaps to win immediately, but he isn’t able to do any of them consistently.

16.7% of Mercilus’ pressures are “unearned pressures.”  That number isn’t strikingly high, but most of the top pass rushers hover just above the 10% mark.

What you have with Whitney Mercilus is a player who very well may have made a big improvement from his first three seasons in the league to his fourth.  His 12 sacks in 2015, however, are still misleading about the player he is.  Mercilus isn’t a bad pass rusher by any means.  He can win with various rush moves, he is very adept mentally, and he is versatile as far as where he can line up along the defensive line.  Those three things do not a top tier pass rusher make, though.  They alone can make a solid player, which is what Mercilus is.  Nothing more, nothing less.

Betting on Mercilus to ever break his career high of 12 sacks, barring something strange, is probably a poor choice.  He is much more the high-single-digit sack player that he performed like in his first three years in the league.  That production is still good for a player of Mercilus’ caliber, especially considering that he could be pushed down the depth chart if Jadeveon Clowney ever manages to be consistently healthy.

The two Seattle Seahawks fans who I enjoy the most are Danny Kelly and Zach Whitman, who both write for Field Gulls, SB Nation’s Seahawks blog. It seemed natural to bend one of their ears when the topic of Bruce Irvin came up. Please visit the site and read their content.

JM: What do you think the chances are that Bruce Irvin plays for the Seattle Seahawks in 2016?

DK: Honestly, at this point it seems like it’s about an 80-percent chance he’s playing for another team in 2016. Seattle’s cap is a little tight and they’re already paying Bobby Wagner and K.J. Wright top dollar for the linebacker position. Irvin is a very good SAM in Seattle’s system, but he’s not a top-tier pass rusher that would command the type of money some team is going to offer him thinking that he can be more effective as a full time rusher, I think.

JM: Irvin’s fifth-year option, that the Seahawks declined to pick up, was worth $7.8 million in 2016. Jason La Canfora said teams would do cartwheels to land Irvin anywhere near $9 million per season on his next contract. John Clayton threw the $9.5 million per season number out. Is declining his option viewed in the Seattle community as a mistake?

DK: No. With the role that Irvin plays in Seattle’s scheme (SAM on base downs, pass rusher on nickel downs), the production has just not been there to give him top-tier pass rusher money. He’s super athletic and does play a nice role in the Seahawks’ scheme, but it’s generally believed that Seattle could replace Irvin with two separate players — a base SAM and a situational pass rusher — for less money.

JM: Draft weekend last year, there were rumors that Irvin would be traded to the Atlanta Falcons, where former Seahawks defensive coordinator Dan Quinn was a first-year head coach. At least with that situation, he was raised in Atlanta, even if he told BSO that he wanted to be there before the 2015 season had even kicked off.

Now, he’s tweeting about loving Florida and following every member of Jacksonville Twitter, where Gus Bradley, the Seahawks defensive coordinator before Quinn, is the head coach. Do Seahawks fans feel betrayal over the idea that he’s had one foot out of the door for some time now, with a path in mind to a former Seattle coach?

DK: I don’t get the impression Seahawks fans feel betrayed about that — the team didn’t pick up his fifth-year option, so the fans recognize that he might feel more inclined to test the market, and they recognize that he’ll likely get more money on the open market. Generally, I think fans know that it’s going to be hard to keep him with their salary cap constraints. Irvin is definitely a fan favorite and is one of the more entertaining twitter follows from the team, so I haven’t gotten any impression there’s hard feelings out there. In fact, it’s kind of the opposite — everyone is kind of bummed to know he’s probably gone.

JM: In a free agency class with Mario Williams, Aldon Smith, Jason Pierre-Paul, Greg Hardy, Tamba Hali, Chris Long, Malik Jackson, Robert Ayers, Olivier Vernon, and Junior Galette, why does Irvin deserve to stand out as an option?

DK: I’m not sure that he does. I think he’s a really solid and dependable SAM/DE hybrid player in Seattle’s system but I’m not sure if he’s ever going to be a top-tier pass rusher. Maybe that’s how teams see him, but I think there’s a little bit of projection still — basically if he gets top dollar, teams are saying that they think he has the skills to become one of those ten-plus sack guys. I don’t think he’s proven so far that he is that type of player. I will say that Irvin still is one of the top athletes in the NFL probably, so that’s one aspect where he stands out.

JM: Everyone talks about how NFL franchises are looking for the next Von Miller. Irvin aesthetically looks like Miller and the quarterback he’s sacked the most in his NFL career is Cam Newton. How would you explain the difference between the two?

DK: I don’t think that Irvin has the repertoire of pass rush moves that Miller has. Athletically they’re both elite, but Miller is more refined as a technician. I also think that Miller probably plays with more power and pop in his hands. If Irvin doesn’t get the edge immediately he can get caught up on blockers. Irvin does have a good speed-to-power bullrush but he doesn’t have any other “trademark” moves really.

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Part 2: Bruce Irvin Pressure Production by Anthony Chiado

Bruce Irvin.  The 10 million dollar man (reportedly).  I am here to tell you why he doesn’t deserve that money.

Bruce Irvin’s usage pattern is very specific and it extends beyond just his alignment, but more on that later.  Irvin was used pretty much exclusively on the right edge of the defensive line as either a 7 or 9-technique.  He spent 87.3% of his snaps in one of those two alignments.  That’s an incredibly high number when you’re talking about a player needing to adjust to a situation in a new environment that he might not be familiar with.  Irvin had very little experience on the left side of the defensive line in 2015 and even less on the interior.  Whichever team signs Irvin is going to need a to have a plan for him.

In addition to his very narrow alignment pattern, the way the Seahawks used Irvin wasn’t necessarily conducive to success as a pass rusher.  He has the ability to do multiple things for a defense and was used as such.  That limited his experience as a pass rusher, though, and his Pressure Production results reflect that.

As a pass rusher, Irvin was relatively disappointing for the value of the contract he is reportedly going to see.  Compared to one of the other top free agent EDGE rushers, Olivier Vernon, who is supposedly going to see a similar contract, Irvin is clearly the inferior pass rusher.  He only has a 10.8% pressure rate overall (10.9% on the edge).  For comparison, Vernon’s pressure rate nearly 20%.  The frequency with which Irvin was able to beat blockers without creating pressure doesn’t paint a much prettier picture.  Such plays occurred on 24.7% of Irvin’s edge snaps and 24.5% of his snaps overall.

So essentially what you’re getting with Irvin is a player who positively impacts the play for the defense on 4 out of every 10 plays, on a good day.  His 64.4% loss rate on the edge and 64.7% loss rate overall are far too high for a player who supposedly has value as a $10 million+ per year pass rusher.  What you’re getting with Bruce Irvin is a player who doesn’t win nearly often enough to justify his contract value.  On top of that he is a very one dimensional player.

41.7% of Irvin’s pass rushing successes came from bending-the-edge.  If you add in the 8.3% of his successes that came from an initial jump, you end up with exactly 50% of Irvin’s snaps coming from a “speed rush”.  That number is good in some ways and bad in others.  Irvin truly is one of the best speed rushers in the NFL.  He has the initial burst to win off the snap and the flexibility to break his rushes off to the quarterback.  That, at the least, provides him a safe floor as a pass rusher.

The problem is that in 2015 it was very easy for offensive tackles to adjust to Irvin’s speed.  While he can devastate on the edge, he struggles coming up with any kind of counter move to go through or inside of blockers.  When you add in successes that were due to coverage or being left unblocked to the percentage of plays where Irvin won with a speed rush, you get 69.4%.  If you then add in the 5.6% of plays where Irvin won with a rip move, which he only did on true edge rushes, you end up with 75%.  That only leaves a quarter of Irvin’s successes that came from some sort of inside move.  Opposing offensive tackles were aware of the fact that Irvin can’t really do much if you take the edge away from him and that’s exactly what they did.  You force him to either run an extremely wide arc or beat you with an inside move, and he’s going to severely struggle doing the latter.

A one dimensional pass rusher is not worth $10 million+ per year.  I don’t want to fall into using broad jargon terms here, but for Irvin to improve his “technique” and “awareness” enough to become a multi-dimensional pass rusher is not likely.  He would need the perfect situation with the perfect coach.  It’s clear that Seattle was not a situation anywhere near perfect for his abilities.  They just couldn’t use Irvin and Cliff Avril in the same role at the same time, so Irvin was relegated to playing way too many snaps in coverage.  Despite what he may look like, Irvin is much more pass rusher than linebacker.  If he goes to Jacksonville or Atlanta he will likely be misused in the exact same way he was in Seattle.

As Justis mentioned to me a few days ago, the Giants are probably his best fit.  And I think a $5-10 million deal is much more suitable than the $10 million+ he will probably end up getting.

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Part 3: Bruce Irvin’s Career Sacks by Justis Mosqueda

2015 Season: 6 credited sacks

15 Games/12 Starts

Green Bay [RE, edge]

Chicago (.5) [RE, edge]

Carolina 1.1 [RE, edge]

Carolina 1.2 [standing RE, T-E stunt]

Dallas [standing RE, chase]

Minnesota [RE, edge]

Minnesota (playoff, .5) [RE, T-E stunt/cleanup]

2014 Season: 8.5 credited sacks

15 Games/13 Starts

Dallas [ROLB, inside/chase]

Carolina 1.1 [RE, edge/OL]

Carolina 1.2 [RE, chase]

Arizona 1.1 (.5) [RE, T-E stunt/cleanup]

San Francisco 1.1 [ROLB, chase]

San Francisco 2.1 [RE, T-E stunt]

St. Louis 2.1 [RE, edge]

Carolina (playoff) [ROLB, inside]

New England (playoff) [RE, chase]

2013 Season: 2 credited sacks

12 Games/12 Starts

Indianapolis [ROLB, edge]

St. Louis [LOLB, chase]

2012 Season: 9 credited sacks

16 Games/0 Starts

Dallas (.5) [LE, inside]

Green Bay 1.1 [LE, inside]

Green Bay 1.2 [LE, inside]

Carolina 1.1 [LE, T-E stunt/chase]

Carolina 1.2 [LE, T-E stunt]

Minnesota (.5) [LE, edge/OL]

New York Jets 1.1 [LE, inside]

New York Jets 1.2 [LE, OL]

Arizona [LE, T-E stunt]

Washington (playoff) [LE, chase]

Ian Wharton is a featured columnist at Bleacher Report. He does great NFL Draft work and used to cover the Miami Dolphins for the site. When I was trying to think of Dolphins-centric writers, Ian’s name was the first to pop into my head. He recently wrote on the pass-rusher Olivier Vernon for B/R. Start your journey in this piece by reading his; It’s very worth your time.

JM: What do you think the chances are that Olivier Vernon plays for the Miami Dolphins in 2016?

IW: Very low. The transition tag seemed to be either a hedge against Miami striking out on another aggressive approach in free agency, or a favor to David Canter, Vernon’s agent. If they really wanted to retain Vernon, I think the exclusive tag would have been given.

JM: The hit rate for pass-rushers in the third round isn’t high. Though we don’t talk about it, there are as many busts at the EDGE position as at quarterback after the first round. Why do you think Vernon was “the one” who was able to develop?

IW: Two names: Kacy Rodgers and Cam Wake. Rodgers is one of the best defensive line coaches in the NFL, and now he’s doing work with the Jets as the defensive coordinator. Vernon’s consistency with hand placement and leverage have noticeably improved. I believe that comes from coaching from the staff and other great players helping.

JM: Vernon didn’t have great jumps or agility drills at the combine, which kept him from passing the Force Players filter. Typically, younger players tend to test worse than more veteran players, and Vernon is only a 25-year-old after four seasons in the NFL. With that being said, he had 11.5 sacks in his sophomore year. Did he ever appear to drastically change in terms of athleticism while with the Dolphins?

IW: I don’t think so. He doesn’t win with speed consistently, nor does he show bend through contact too often. It’s hit or miss still. I think he plays to his tests quite well.

JM: There are some concerns that his sack numbers have been inflated by those he’s been fortunate enough to play with on Miami’s defensive line. Cameron Wake, Ndamukong Suh and Jared Odrick are among that group. How much is Vernon a product of his environment?

IW: I’d speculate that a majority of his production comes from cleaning up what others create. He disappeared for large portions of games and rarely, if ever, took over as the alpha pass-rusher. He needs to be in a similar situation to succeed.

JM: Heading into free agency, what is ideal role for a defense?

IW: I think most of his success came in nickel packages when he slide inside to 3-tech in 2013. In base packages, weak-side end in a 4-3 under or maybe LEO role will help create enough space for him to work.

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Part 2: Olivier Vernon Pressure Production by Anthony Chiado

As I said, I’ve started to use a new charting system for Pressure Production that should provide a better picture of each player.  One of the biggest changes with this new system is keeping track of alignment data more in depth than simply whether the rusher lined up on the edge or interior.

The Dolphins heavily used Vernon on the right side of their defensive line (facing the left side of the offensive line).  He spent 94.6% of his snaps there, as opposed to 2.7% each on the left side and interior.  He is clearly much more comfortable on the left side of the line and his experience there gives him a natural feel that he doesn’t show on the right side.  It should be obvious from his body type, but Vernon also isn’t the type of player who is going to be shifted to the interior very often.  He is strictly an edge pass rusher.  I think his talent level as a pass rusher would allow him to adapt better than most if the team who signs him wants to use him in a more versatile way, but keeping him in the familiar environment of the left side will maximize his return.

Here is the area where the change in the charting system makes the biggest difference.  I had previously only been tracking “pressures” and “losses”, but that is a far too simplistic way to view pass rushes.  So, I made the change to keeping track of pressures, wins, and losses (credit to Arif Hasan for giving me this idea).  This makes it easier to correctly categorize the result of the play, rather than trying to fit it into a category that doesn’t necessarily fit.

From charting with the other system I had a pretty good understanding of what good and bad results were.  To help understand this new system better I charted some players with the new and the old, including Vernon.  What I figured out was that the numbers that we see with Vernon usually translate to good numbers in the old system.  We also see that Vernon is a better pass rusher on the edge than the interior, even though 4 snaps on the interior doesn’t really give us a big enough sample size to make any real conclusions.  

Looking at just attempts on the edge, Vernon created pressure 18.6% of the time, which equates to 18.1% of his total attempts.  That means that on nearly 1 out of every 5 times he rushed, he strongly negatively influenced the play for the offense.  On another 32.9% of his attempts he registered a “win”.  That essentially means he was able to beat his man, but didn’t really negatively impact the play for the offense.  For example, he may have been able to get the edge on the offensive tackle and force the quarterback to step up in the pocket but he was still able to finish making his reads and deliver a throw on target.  He lost on the other 49% of his pass rushes, which essentially means that he’s benefiting the defense on half of the plays where he rushes the passer.  That may not seem great just thinking about it, but you have to contextualize the numbers.  A quarterback completing only 50% pass attempts is really bad, a wide receiver only getting open on half of the routes he runs isn’t good, but a pass rusher “winning” on half of your attempts is quite good.  The nature of the position makes it more difficult to succeed and the impact that pass rushers have when they pressure the quarterback is bigger than a single completed pass or successful route.

His Sack Conversion Rate of 25.9% isn’t great, but it also isn’t terrible, especially considering that his ability to bring the quarterback to the ground improved later in the season as he got over a nagging leg injury.  Vernon showed that he can be a double digit sack player in 2013, when he racked up 11.5, and I think it’s reasonable to think he can hover between 10 and 15 for at least his next contract.

The ways that Vernon beat blockers illustrate very well the type of player he is.  His most impactful move was a bull rush, which he used on nearly one third of the plays where he won.  At the combine Vernon did very well in the jumping tests.  That lower body explosion is where his ability to translate to speed to power comes from.  He is also able to mix in other moves so blockers aren’t able to key in on his bull rush on every play.  He isn’t the most flexible EDGE rusher in the world, but 21.1% of his wins came from bending-the-edge due to his ability to counter offensive tackles oversetting in order to stop his bull rush.

Vernon also has the technical aspect of pass rushing down.  His hands aren’t the most violent, but he uses them extremely efficiently to combat blockers.  Vernon employs a very effective rip move, a spin move that allowed him to create pressure on nearly 100% of the attempts where he used it, and a swim move that allows him to take pass rushes to the interior of the blocker very smoothly.  On top of that, only 7.8% of his wins came due to coverage or being left unblocked.

With Vernon you aren’t getting the most athletic pass rusher.  He’s probably never going to break the 15 sack barrier and he’s more of a second tier EDGE rusher than a top tier one.  That being said, he is very capable of being a team’s number one rusher and I think you can rely on him to give you just over 10 sacks each season.  That is something that the vast majority of teams in the league need and should be aggressively looking for.  Just one month ago in the Super Bowl we saw how important pass rushers are for stopping a potent offense.  Vernon obviously isn’t on the level of Miller or Ware, but his contract will reflect the importance of having good players on the edge.

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Part 3: Olivier Vernon’s Career Sacks by Justis Mosqueda

2015 Season: 7.5 credited sacks

16 Games/16 Starts

Tennessee [RE, T-E stunt]

New England 1.1 [standing RE, edge]

Dallas [RE, edge]

New York Jets 2.1 [standing RE, inside]

Baltimore 1.1 [standing RE, chase]

Baltimore 1.2 (.5) [standing RE, edge]

Baltimore 1.3 [standing RE, OL]

San Diego (.5) [standing RE, cleanup]

New England 2.1 (.5) [standing RE, edge]

2014 Season: 6.5 credited sacks

16 Games/16 Starts

New England 1.1 [standing RE, inside]

Kansas City [standing RE, cleanup]

Green Bay 1.1 [RE, edge]

Green Bay 1.2 (.5) [RE, chase]

San Diego [RE, outside]

Buffalo 2.1 [RE, inside]

Baltimore [RE, inside]

2013 Season: 11.5 credited sacks

16 Games/14 Starts

Indianapolis (.5) [standing RE, cleanup]

New Orleans [RE, outside]

Baltimore [RE, chase]

Buffalo 1.1 [RE, inside]

New England 1.1 [RE, inside]

San Diego [RE, inside]

Carolina 1.1 [RE, chase]

Carolina 1.2 [RE, chase]

New York Jets 1.1 [RE, edge]

New York Jets 1.2 [standing DT, stunt]

New York Jets 1.3 [standing DT, inside]

Pittsburgh [standing DT, stunt]

2012 Season: 3.5 credited sacks

16 Games/0 Starts

New York Jets 1.1 (.5) [RE, cleanup]

St. Louis 1.1 [DT, OL]

St. Louis 1.2 [standing RE, inside]

Buffalo 2.1 [standing RE, cleanup]

I’m starting with this intro for two reasons: 1) I’m probably not going to focus on writing about Pressure Production results for rookies as heavily next year as I am this year.  If one or two of them have results that might be able to provide some large insight as to who they are as a player that we didn’t already know, then sure, they deserve to be delved into further.  But for the most part, there just isn’t enough to learn and it’s irresponsible to form opinions on information that has such little impact on who players will become. And 2) Bud Dupree is yet another rookie who’s Pressure Production profile is going to feel mundane.  There really isn’t much encouraging about how he played as a rookie.  However, because of the way I viewed him as a prospect, and perhaps some homerism as a Steelers fan, I still have faith that he can become a very good player.

Here is the data on his rookie season.

Creating pressure was Dupree’s weakest area as a rookie.  There are some aspects of how he won and what he was able to do after creating pressure that are encouraging.  His success rates, more than anything else, confirm that he is just as raw as we thought he was, though.  Yet, he didn’t even perform that bad compared to even the best rookie EDGE rushers in 2015.

Dupree spent the overwhelming majority of his snaps on the edge, a testament to the Steelers’ efforts to keep his role as simplified as possible.  In his 84 edge snaps, he won on 31% of them.  That isn’t a good number by any means, but it is comparably the best part of his chart.  On the 11 snaps where the rushed on the interior, he didn’t create a pressure.  The only one of the players charted so far not to do so.  Just like he took most of his snaps on the EDGE, Dupree also faced a single blocker on the overwhelming majority of his attempts.  89 to be exact.  On those 89 attempts he won on 26 of them, which equates to a rate of 29.2%.  That rate is the worst among all of the players charted so far.  He only faced 6 double teams in the eight games I charted, but, just like on interior attempts, he failed to create a pressure.

Dupree’s Cumulative Success Rate of 27.4% is not good.  It’s the worst among the players charted.  It also isn’t miserable.  Considering I have focused on charting upper tier players, being only slightly behind the back is fine for a player who we knew would have hiccups coming into the league.

The ways that Dupree created pressure give me the most optimism about his future development.  Everyone was able to peg him for the hugely undeveloped player that he is.  He doesn’t really have the ability to win in any way other with his natural athleticism.  That was clear at Kentucky and it showed in his rookie season.  50% of his wins came from his explosion; either running by offensive tackles right off the snap or running through them by means of his lower body explosion.  As the season progressed, though, teams began to adjust.  The tackles that Dupree was facing knew he could only win initially off the snap, so they didn’t even need to bother bracing for a counter attack.  Dupree recognized this and progressively attempted to use various counter attacks to win later in the season, but he was just not developed enough to do so.  It’s a good sign that he began to develop recognition skills as the season progressed and that his athleticism can still be used as a “trump card” (s/o Matt Harmon), but he still  has lots of development ahead of him if he wants to be an impact pass rusher.

In college, Dupree was pegged as an uber-athletic player that wasn’t polished enough nor a high enough energy player to make him more than an athletic project.  All of that was true then and most of it is still true now.  However, Dupree’s effort issues seem to have subsided in Pittsburgh.  His lack of effort at Kentucky put a cap on his production, but in the NFL it has actually helped sustain it.

On Dupree’s 26 pressures I charted 3 sacks, which is an 11.5% Sack Conversion Rate.  2 of those 3 sacks actually came from coverage pressures.  Which, by their very nature, require the pass rusher to relentlessly pursue the quarterback throughout the play.  College Dupree might not have converted those sacks, but NFL Dupree did.  That in and of itself is a testament to his progression as a player, not necessarily something that should be used against him.

As the season progressed, Dupree got worse.  It is expected that most rookies improve as the season progresses, but in this case it makes sense that Dupree did not.  As he was adjusting to the rest of the NFL, the rest of the NFL was simultaneously adjusting to his athleticism, and their adjustment was much easier than his was.  So, when we look at the big picture of Dupree’s rookie season we see more of the same.  He was a disappointment as rookie, but showed signs of life that give me hope for his future.

If we hold out on making judgement on any player from the 2015 draft class, Dupree is probably that player.  It is still going to take all of the development we thought it would, but he still has the potential to pick up as an uber-productive pass rusher right where James Harrison and Lamarr Woodley left off.

Maybe not.

Maybe our expectations of Beasley were the flaw.  Maybe he performed as well as could have been expected of him.  After all, playing through a torn labrum on a team who finished last in the league in sacks are less than ideal conditions.  Although Beasley only had 4 sacks on the season, he still led the Falcons.  Putting his season in context makes it look much better.  And that’s even without considering the usual learning curve for pass rushers.  Michael Strahan, who holds the record for single season sacks, played his first 3 full seasons with 4.5, 7.5, and 5 sacks, respectively.  In his fourth full season he jumped to 14 sacks and finished his career out by putting up double digit totals in nearly every season.  J.J. Watt, perhaps the best defensive player in the league today, only totaled 5.5 sacks in his first season.  In his four seasons since he brought quarterbacks down 20.5, 10.5, 20.5, and 17.5 times, respectively.  In DeMarcus Ware’s first season he only had 8 sacks.  Since his 2005 rookie year, he has put up double digit sacks in every season where he played the full 16 games.

It’s no secret that EDGE rusher’s have one of the steepest, if not the steepest, learning curve of any position.  That was just conveniently forgotten when Vic Beasley came to town.

Off the bat, Beasley’s pressure rates don’t look good.  A 32.8% cumulative pressure rate is nothing to write home about in general.  When looking at it within the frame of all EDGE rushers, these numbers are equivalent to a decent number two.  When looking at it within the context of other rookie rushers, though, they look much better.  Beasley’s Cumulative Success Rate is second among rookies only to Preston Smith’s 33%.  That is incredibly small margin for the sample size that we’re dealing with.

These numbers look even better once again when you take into account Beasley’s improvement over the course of the season.  Four of the eight games of Beasley that I charted were in the first half of the season and four were in the second half.  His Cumulative Success Rate from the first four games was 31.2%, while over the second half of the season that improved to 35.7%.  We know that it takes time for EDGE rushers to find their footing in the NFL, so seeing Beasley make strides within his first year is very encouraging.

As far as usage goes, Beasley took 93% of his charted snaps on the edge and 7% on the inside.  That is unlikely to change anytime soon, as it is rumored that he might make a move to SAM linebacker in 2016.  Moving to linebacker shouldn’t make too much of an effect on Beasley’s role, though, as the SAM position in Dan Quinn’s scheme is essentially the same as the LEO, which Beasley spent much of his time at in 2015.

I made this point a few times earlier in the season, but during his rookie season Beasley won in exactly the same ways we expected him to before the draft.  He is heavily reliant on his natural athleticism, which many rookies are, but he does show some variety to his approach.

Other than being a #ForcePlayer#, Beasley’s biggest selling point as a pass rusher was the ability to beat an offensive tackle in a variety of ways on any given play.  Each move was just as deadly as the last and the next.  That doesn’t exactly hold true for his rookie season performance, but essentially being a toned down version of his college self is a good sign.  He also showed that his athleticism could still be a threat even when not being consistently complemented by counter moves.  These are all good signs for Beasley’s future career prospects.

Bringing the quarterback to the ground once he beat offensive tackles was one of Beasley’s strong points at Clemson.  It wasn’t as much so during his rookie season.  Out of the around 15 players of whom I have charted 6 games, Beasley has by far the lowest Conversion Percentage and the only one not in double digits.  That would be concerning if Beasley wasn’t creating pressure at a high level and if we didn’t know about the career trends that EDGE rushers usually follow.  If Beasley is able to continue putting pressure on the quarterback, sacks will follow.

As bad as Beasley’s rookie year looked as the season progressed, that isn’t really the case.  In fact, it was quite encouraging.  Producing as a rookie EDGE rusher is no easy task, especially with the torn labrum and lack of surrounding talent that Beasley was faced with.  Sure Beasley didn’t meet the expectations we had for him, but maybe that was more our fault than his.  Just because a he was an elite prospect, doesn’t mean he should have been expected to come in and immediately produce at an elite level.  After all, some of the best pass rushers in recent history were just as “disappointing” in their rookie seasons.

Beasley may be stuck amongst the top of the pack in terms of rookie EDGE rushers, but I still feel confident that he can rise above the pack and become the elite pass rusher that many envisioned when ranking him atop the 2015 Draft class.

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My next two Pressure Production pieces are going to focus on Bud Dupree and Hau’oli Kikaha.  You can vote on who comes next here.  Following those two posts I am going to turn my focus towards free agent pass rushers and will have somewhat of an announcement on the future format of Pressure Production.

Hunter was pegged as an uber-athletic pass rusher gifted with ideal size and length for the NFL.  The only problem was that he had no clue what to do when actually on the football field.  At least we thought.  There is no denying that Hunter looked lost at times at LSU, maybe even most of the time.  Perhaps we overlooked the fact that when Hunter wanted to be dominant he could be so with the flip of a switch.  Many a college defensive lineman seem to have this problem until they reach NFL competition and magically seem to keep the flip switch on permanently.

It seems as though every time there is a player like this in college, they get past their inconsistencies at the next level.  Maybe it’s more than a fluke at this point.

In the past few draft classes we have had Timmy Jernigan, Aaron Lynch, Mario Edwards, and Danielle Hunter, among others.  Shilique Calhoun is even an example in this year’s class and friend of #PM Hank Jones went in-depth about it for Big Cat Country.  There is always inherently more risk with these players than with those that perform consistently in college. When these players flip that metaphorical switch, even if it is only for a few plays each game, it can make a huge difference.

In Minnesota, Hunter has been able to permanently flip the switch.  He certainly still does have plays where he looks lost, but any rookie would.  The Vikings gameplan on how to sparingly use Hunter has also helped mitigate his inconsistency.   The huge mental progression Hunter made during his rookie season and his unique physical talents make his rookie season just the first step in his career.  Here is his rookie season through the lens of Pressure Production.

Right off the bat you can see that Hunter played limited snaps his rookie year.  He totaled 112 chartable pass rushes in the 8 games charted ( the 8 games in which he played the highest percentage of the team’s snaps), which averages out to 14 per game.  Most players end up sitting between 15 and 20 per game.  Just on chartable pass rushes that puts him around 3 to 4 snaps behind most of the players I have charted, which probably leaves him around 15 snaps behind overall when counting non-chartable pass rushes and run defense.

What he did with those limited snaps is what made him special as a rookie.

It is to be expected that any rookie, especially one who was viewed as “raw” coming into the league like Hunter, will spend a lot of their snaps not making an impact.  Hunter is no exception to that.  He certainly had his fair share of disappearing acts but he also had his fair share of game breaking plays.

He spent the large majority of his rushes on the edge against one blocker, which gave him the ability to turn the 32.1% of plays where he won into something more impactful than a pressure.

Hunter won as a pass rusher just as you thought he would when watching him at LSU.  Hunter’s biggest redeeming trait is his length and his ability to use it to generate power.  That, combined with his ability to generate power from his lower half, makes his bull rush a dangerous threat.

He is a rare rookie that knows both what his biggest strength is and also how to use it to pressure the quarterback.  That is an invaluable building block for a young EDGE rusher.

Hunter is also well equipped with counter moves for a young pass rusher, especially one who was billed as raw coming into the league.  They aren’t nearly developed enough for him to rely on in a way like Dwight Freeney relies on his spin move, but they are good enough that he can use them occasionally to keep blockers just unsure enough.

What is going to set Hunter apart from many of the other rookie EDGE rushers is his ability to convert pressures into sacks.  Not only did Hunter do this incredibly well compared to how rookies usually fare, but he his conversion rate of 19.4% also looks like it will be one of the best period.

Josh Norris made the saying “pressure is production” famous, at least in football circles, but it is now often taken out of context.  Pressure is only production if it forces a quarterback to make a mistake or abandon part of the play, which, at least on pressure from the edge, doesn’t happen near as often as it is made out to.

The interior of the line should be where disruption should come from, with EDGE rushers using that disruption to bring a flustered quarterback to the ground.  An EDGE rusher who does this as proficiently as Hunter does at such a young age is invaluable to a productive pass rush and a suffocating defense.

Danielle Hunter is just another example of a defensive linemen who was billed as “talented but inconsistent”, for lack of a better term, coming out of college that shelved those concerns and made a big impact in the NFL.  He performed at a high level as a rookie, while also providing a cautionary tale of sorts as to why we need to put more weight on flash plays for defensive line prospects.

He is on pace to become a star EDGE rusher in Minnesota.

Edge rushers have one of the toughest transitions to the next level in today’s NFL, so it is by no means time to write off any of these players, more-so it is encouraging that Smith was able to transition so smoothly.  Most players are either able to consistently create pressure and struggle at converting sacks or struggle creating pressure in the first place.  In Preston Smith’s rookie season he was an effective pressure creator, but his conversion ability is what made it special.

Although Smith’s versatility to line up in various different spots along the defensive line was viewed as on of his biggest strengths, Washington did not use him as such.  He took pretty much all of his pass rush attempts lining up at outside linebacker in Washington’s 3-4 scheme.  He was effective enough when used this way to be the team’s second best pass rusher, but you have to wonder how much more effective he would have been if used in various different alignments.  After all, although it is too limited of a sample to draw any conclusions from, Pressure Production showed that Smith had more success rushing on the interior than he did on the edge.

As you can see, Smith spent 84.8% of his pass rush attempts on the edge, as opposed to 15.2% on the interior.  On those 95 attempts that Smith took on the edge, he had a success rate of 32.6%.  On the 17 attempts that he took on the interior, he had a success rate of 35.3%.  Now, statistically speaking, the sampling size here isn’t anywhere near large enough to draw a conclusion on if all of Smith’s snaps would look this way.  In fact, across the whole season Smith may have had more success on the edge than on the interior.  There is at least enough information here, thought, to justify that Washington using Smith in a more versatile way would have opened up more opportunities for both him and teammates.

In terms of how Smith fared against single blockers vs. multiple blockers, there isn’t much of a conversation to be had.  He only took 9 of his 112 attempts facing more than one blocker and he didn’t have a success on any of them, something that you would probably expect from a rookie.  All of his 37 successes came against a single blocker, which translates to a 35.3% success rate.  Overall, Smith sported a 33% success rate on his 112 attempts, which isn’t anything special, but it’s something a rookie can hang his hat on.

In terms of how Smith wins, it’s all pretty expected.  Coming out of Mississippi State, Smith was viewed as someone who could rush the passer with power and speed, as well as a good jump off the snap.  He was able to transition all of those skills to the NFL level in his first season.  Smith did flash some ability to mix in alternate rush moves, but for the most part he relied on his three college strengths to power him through his rookie year.  70.3% of his pressures came from bull rush (37.8%), shoulder dip (18.9%), and initial jump (13.5%), while 18.9% came off of other pass rush moves, and 10.8% came on plays when he was unblocked.

One plays where Smith had success creating pressure, he converted that pressure into sacks at a very high rate.  Especially for a rookie.  On the 37 plays where he created pressure in the 8 games that I charted, Smith converted 6 of those into sacks, which converts to 16.2%.  So far, Ziggy Ansah has the highest conversion rate of any of the players charted with 22%, followed by Khalil Mack with 20%.  16.2% is not a special number by any means, but when most rookies struggles to get the quarterback on the ground, it’s promising for Smith’s future.

There wasn’t anything special about Smith’s rookie season.  He didn’t do anything that most people wouldn’t have expected out of him and he wasn’t a force that could throw off an offenses whole game plan.  What he did do was provide a consistent pass rushing presence in a season where most other rookies wilted with the change of scenery.  Most pass rushers take a massive step in their second and third seasons, which for Smith would mean being among the elites.  Now, I don’t necessarily think Smith will be able to take that massive step since he started on higher ground, but I’m excited to see how he will grow in his next few seasons in the league.